INTRODUCTION
"Plagiarism" is the act of passing off the ideas or words of another as one's own, or the act of offering as original to oneself another person's words or ideas.
1 Although plagiarism is a recurring problem in some lawrelated contexts, few lawyers give it any thought when evaluating judicial performance. It seems virtually certain that a similarly small number of judges concern themselves with plagiarism when preparing opinions or orders. This inattention is unfortunate. Lawyers and judges should be more focused on the issue. Consider the following two examples.
In the first case, the parties had tried the insurance coverage action to the court for over a week, with the plaintiff claiming there was coverage for the judgment in the underlying case and the insurance company defending on the basis that an exclusion in its policy barred coverage for the loss. 2 At the close of the evidence, the judge took the matter under advisement and instructed the lawyers for both sides to promptly submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which they did. Two weeks later, the judge announced by conference call that she had decided in favor of the plaintiff. She then adopted the plaintiff's lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law as the court's own and entered judgment on them. The findings of fact and conclusions of law were grossly inadequate. Numerous conclusions of law were incorrectly denominated as findings of fact; 3 the cases cited in the conclusions of law certainly favored the plaintiff's theory of the case but were just as certainly inapposite; nowhere in the conclusions of law did the court apply the law to the facts or distinguish the cases that the defense lawyers understandably considered controlling; the findings of fact, while supporting the plaintiff's theory of the case, bore little resemblance to the evidence actually introduced at trial; and the document nowhere reflected that the court had weighed competing evidence on any point. In short, the judge signed the findings of fact and conclusions of law exactly as presented by the plaintiff's lawyers. If the defendant ever suspected that the judge was predisposed to rule against it, this outcome arguably provided foundation for that belief. The judge's conduct might have invited concern that she was an unreliable jurist who could not be trusted to correctly decide other cases. At a minimum the judge appeared to be lazy and inattentive. Alternatively, think of an employment discrimination case in which the defendant moves for summary judgment and the plaintiff files a memorandum in opposition. Two or three months after briefing has closed, the district court grants the defendant's motion. The factual recitation in the court's opinion is obviously assembled from the statements of uncontroverted fact in the defendant's memorandum in support of its motion, and the court's legal reasoning is copied nearly verbatim from the well-written-almost scholarly-argument section of the defendant's memorandum. The very slight changes in the court's opinion involve punctuation, verb tense, and the like.
In fact, the practices illustrated here might well be labeled judicial plagiarism. 4 To be sure, in many respects the first example does not fit the common definition or understanding of plagiarism. For starters, the judge invited the lawyers to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, such that her adoption of them was done with the lawyers' full conclusions of law in orders or judgments often attempt to avoid such confusion by including in the order or judgment statements to the effect that any finding of fact that is actually a conclusion of law should be so considered or construed, and vice versa. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 304 n.10 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that the district court had explicitly stated that any findings of fact that were actually conclusions of law should be so knowledge and permission. Such requests and subsequent adoption of the prevailing party's submission are widespread practices. 5 Courts' request that lawyers submit judgments and orders for judges' signature is similarly established. 6 Busy courts' adoption of parties' filings and reliance on lawyers to prepare orders and judgments promote the expeditious disposition of cases. 7 Courts consider lawyers' preparation of findings of fact and conclusions of law to be "a valuable aid to decision making." 8 More fundamentally and certainly as displayed in the second example, lawyers want judges to copy their work. Scores of lawyers have been counseled by senior colleagues to write appellate briefs and trial court legal memoranda in a style that will tempt courts to replicate their work in the related decisions. 9 As one practitioner-turned-professor has explained, "I tell my first-year legal writing students truthfully that I knew I had written the best brief that I possibly could on a motion when the court's opinion announcing its decision was directly cut-and-pasted from my brief." 10 On the other hand, the resulting opinion or order is not the court's work product and may not even reflect the court's independent judgment or reasoning. If an opinion or order cannot fairly be attributed to the court, describing the process of its production and adoption as judicial plagiarism is perfectly apt. Regardless, the wholesale incorporation of one party's findings of fact and legal conclusions in a judicial decision is troubling.
11
The practice "detracts from the appearance of a hardworking, independent judge."
12 It risks creating the appearance that the court has ceded its 16 the British Columbia Court of Appeals vacated a trial court judgment because "the reasons for judgment" could "not be taken to represent the trial judge's analysis of the issues or the reasoning for his conclusions." 17 In a nutshell, the trial judge's 105-page decision included 84 pages of "wholesale, uncritical reproduction of the respondents' written submissions." 18 The trial court copied 321 of the 368 paragraphs stating the reasons for its opinion nearly verbatim from the respondents' final written submissions. 19 Of the 222 paragraphs focusing on liability, only 30 were in the judge's words and, of those, 20 were introductory, summarized the parties' submissions, or set forth 13. 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990 uncontroverted facts. 20 None of the liability-related paragraphs that the trial judge authored required independent reasoning.
21
Although the Supreme Court of Canada recently set aside some of the British Columbia Court of Appeals' findings and, in so doing, concluded that the trial judge's wholesale copying was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality, 22 the case remains troubling. The Supreme Court of Canada articulated a reasonable standard for deciding cases such as this, that is, a judgment should be set aside "only if the [judge's] copying is of such a character that a reasonable person apprised of the circumstances would conclude that the judge did not put her mind to the evidence and the issues and did not render an impartial, independent decision," 23 but then appeared to decide the case in a fashion unduly protective of judges. How, on these facts, the court could find that a reasonable person would not conclude the trial judge had declined to "put [his] mind to the evidence" is a mystery, unless "a reasonable person apprised of the circumstances" really means only a fellow judge. As wellintentioned as the court surely was, its reasoning in support of the trial judge's wholesale copying was at best superficial. The opinion provoked immediate criticism from journalists, who complained that the court had not explained why judges should not be held to "normal standard [ This Article analyzes whether judicial plagiarism constitutes judicial misconduct for which offending judges may be disciplined, or is instead something less-even if it may require reversal on appeal or other procedural correction in extreme cases. 31 The analysis begins in Part II with a comparison of lawyers' plagiarism in litigation, which courts generally consider to be unethical, and judicial plagiarism. Part III discusses judicial plagiarism as a basis for special scrutiny on appellate review and, further, reversal on appeal. Although cases on these issues do not discuss judicial plagiarism as such or frame it as a judicial misconduct concern, they are in many ways instructive. Part IV looks at what appears to be the sole reported decision on judicial plagiarism as judicial misconduct. Although the court in that case appears to have reached the correct result, the opinion is imperfectly reasoned, and it is too short and factually lacking to provide meaningful guidance to other courts or interested observers. Finally, Part V analyzes judicial plagiarism specifically as judicial misconduct. It concludes that judicial plagiarism rises to the level of judicial misconduct when it can be shown that the plagiarized findings of fact, conclusions of law, opinion, or order do not reflect the court's independent judgment. Such cases implicate the judge's bias or partiality, as well as the judge's competence and diligence. Importantly, Part V identifies key factors that courts should weigh in deciding whether judicial plagiarism constitutes misconduct under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 27 . Id. at Canon 1 ("A Judge Shall Uphold and Promote the Independence, Integrity, and Impartiality of the Judiciary, and Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety."); id. at R. 1.2 ("A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.").
28. professional discipline or sanctions. 35 Lawyers who plagiarize almost certainly violate Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), which broadly prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, 36 as well as Model Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 37 Importantly, "plagiarism" for professional responsibility purposes is often held to include the unattributed quotation of judicial opinions and orders, 38 as well as the unattributed quotation of briefs or pleadings written by lawyers in other firms or organizations without those lawyers' consent, 39 although this latter position is not unanimous.
40
The concern when lawyers plagiarize in briefs, pleadings, and other court documents is fundamentally one of misrepresentation to the court. 41 But while that is a legitimate concern where, for example, a lawyer replicates without attribution portions of a treatise or law review article in a brief, it should be less of a worry in other situations. Courts should not cry plagiarism when lawyers attempt to achieve efficiency by adapting written work from other cases, so long as the lawyers whose work is being modeled do not object. For instance, the adaptation of an argument from a brief prepared by another lawyer in a different case with the other lawyer's knowledge should not be considered plagiarism. 42 Copying from a document prepared by another lawyer in the same firm or office, submitting under one's name a brief or legal memorandum prepared by a colleague working on the same case, or copying a model pleading in a formbook, are not acts of plagiarism justifying professional discipline. 43 Judicial defenders thus might argue by analogy that judges who adopt verbatim findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by parties, or who cut and paste portions of parties' briefs into their decisions, should not be accused of plagiarism. There is nothing dishonest about copying findings of fact and conclusions of law when they are expressly requested to facilitate the court's disposition of the case. There is no misrepresentation; the parties know the source of the court's findings and conclusions. Nor should judges who cut-and-paste their decisions from parties' briefs be criticized for plagiarism, since court rules often require parties to submit their briefs in electronic as well as print format, 44 and the submission of a brief in electronic format necessarily functions as consent to adoption by the court. Any lawyer who submits a brief or other document in electronic format surely knows that the requirement of such a submission potentially eases the court's preparation of an opinion. Finally, much like formbook authors want practitioners to copy their work, 45 prevailing lawyers hope that courts will copy their findings of fact, conclusions of law, legal memoranda, and briefs because that practice serves their clients. 46 Unfortunately, these analogies are unhelpful because they miss the relevant issues when the focus is judicial plagiarism. First, bias and partiality are not concerns in lawyer plagiarism cases. Lawyers are advocates for their clients and should articulate the best possible arguments the facts and law reasonably support. 47 Judges, on the other hand, are expected to strive to reach the correct result, which may require them to accept some aspects of a party's argument but reject others, or to weigh facts differently than a party urges. Even if a judge intends to rule in a party's favor, she may decide the case on grounds different than those the party advanced. A court's use of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law "makes it too convenient for the judge to choose between two scenarios rather than devote the time necessary to do what the law requires: fashion a third scenario based upon those portions of the testimony [she] believed."
48 Copying a party's brief, legal memorandum, or other submission verbatim potentially signals that the court did not independently assess the case as a matter of fact or law, and may create the appearance of bias.
49 Indeed, judges who uncritically accept parties' submissions gamble with the correctness of their rulings. 50 The fact that prevailing lawyers want courts to uncritically adopt their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law or copy the legal arguments and accordingly consent to these acts is irrelevant. Judicial bias and partiality do not vanish as concerns simply because the party that allegedly benefits from those factors or influences is pleased by the outcome. It is no answer to say that the losing lawyers cannot complain about judicial plagiarism because they shared the prevailing lawyers' aspirations with respect to the court's adoption of their positions. There are at least three reasons for this. First, this argument rests on the uncertain premise that the losing lawyers expected the court to simply adopt one side's work or the other's rather than using the parties' proposed findings Brief Writing, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2009, at 13, 15 ("Every first-year associate in a law firm litigation department hears the same lecture: You are writing a brief as an advocate for your client, not a law review article providing a neutral assessment of the law and an intellectual discussion of legal principles. This is advice that must be taken to heart."); James L. Robertson, Reality on Appeal, in APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 119, 119 (Priscilla A. Schwab ed., 1992) ("The job of counsel is candid and competent advocacy, within limits.").
48. Brunetti, supra note 12, at 1502. 49. See Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 4, at 16 ("A case is to be won on its merits; copying verbatim extracts from one side's brief . . . or memorandum gives the appearance of bias. It also gives the appearance that a judge has not independently made an assessment of the fair outcome of the case.").
50. See Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 476 (6th Cir. 2009) (Martin, J., dissenting) (criticizing an Immigration Judge's reliance on tainted evidence concerning torture and sarcastically stating that perhaps the judge could not be faulted for her reliance because: "[M]ost of her references to the torture evidence were apparently cut-and-pasted from the government's pre-trial briefs, so maybe she simply had not read the underlying documents. . . . The IJ's opinion included the same errors as the government's briefs, and this plagiarism makes the IJ's remark that she had presided over a 'long and difficult hearing' ring hollow: what went on during the hearing was apparently of little relevance to her ultimate ruling.") (footnotes omitted).
and conclusions simply as a guide for its independent analysis of the evidence and legal authorities. The lawyers surely want evidence of the court's analysis where the issues are close or the ruling will guide or influence subsequent conduct or strategy. Second, and returning to the initial example in the Introduction, this argument assumes that the lawyers for both sides were scrupulous in preparing their relevant submissions. If the prevailing lawyers have engaged in the sort of poor practice related in that example, any bargain to which the losing lawyers might be said to have agreed is off. Third, even assuming that all the lawyers expect the court to adopt one side's work product as its own, parties are generally unaware of this practice. 51 Their expectations count as much or more than the lawyers'. In the end, courts' treatment of plagiarism by lawyers is not instructive when evaluating the ethical dimensions of judicial plagiarism. The considerations are not the same.
II. APPELLATE CASE LAW ON JUDICIAL PLAGIARISM
Unlike plagiarism by lawyers, courts' periodic concern over alleged judicial plagiarism generally has not included an ethics aspect or component. Rather, appellate courts have tended to treat alleged judicial plagiarism as a standard of review issue.
52 This is particularly true in the federal system. To explain, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), when a district court tries a case without a jury, the court's findings of fact "must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." 53 This is a deferential standard of review. 54 In cases in which district courts have adopted the 51. See Bast & Samuels, supra note 7, at 801 ("Although practicing attorneys are aware that it is a common practice for judges to borrow from the writing of attorneys . . . the general public is mostly unaware of this practice.").
52. In State v. McDermott, 810 N.W.2d 237 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012), the court criticized the trial court for its wholesale adoption of the State's brief as its decision on the basis that the trial court had failed to demonstrate its independent analysis of the issues and further failed to explain its rationale to the parties and the public, but concluded that these failures were not grounds for reversal given its de novo review of the trial court's decision. [T] he fact that the trial judge has adopted proposed findings does not, by itself, warrant reversal. But it does raise the possibility that there was insufficient independent evaluation of the evidence and may cause the losing party to believe that his position has not been given the consideration it deserves. These concerns have caused us to call for more careful scrutiny of adopted findings.") (footnote omitted 1965 ) (explaining that a district court's adopted findings will be reviewed "more narrowly and given less weight on review than if they are the work product of the judge himself or at least bear evidence that he has given them careful study and revision"), abrogated by Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) .
58. 470 U.S. 564 (1985) . 59. See id. at 572 ("We, too, have criticized courts for their verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties, particularly when those findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation to the record . . . . We are also aware of the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact when . . . informed that the judge has decided in their favor.").
director. 60 The district court issued a short memorandum decision to that effect, and asked the plaintiff's lawyer to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law elaborating on the rationale for the court's decision stated in the memorandum. 61 The district court adopted the plaintiff's proposed findings and conclusions as its own, with some edits and modifications. 62 The Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis that three of the district court's crucial findings of fact were clearly erroneous. 63 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit closely scrutinized the record because of the district court's adoption of the plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 64 The Fourth Circuit rejected Anderson's argument that the district judge had acted properly by giving the City an opportunity to object to the proposed findings and by not adopting her proposed findings verbatim. 65 According to the Fourth Circuit, the mistake in the district court's procedure lay in its "solicitation of findings after it had already announced its decision and in the court's adoption of the 'substance' of [the] proposed findings."
66
The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court explained that while it had criticized courts for verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties, and it was further aware of the potential for exaggeration and overreaching by lawyers preparing findings of fact after learning that the judge has found in their clients' favor, even the adoption of proposed findings of fact verbatim does not change the standard of review on appeal. 67 Findings that are adopted verbatim nonetheless remain "those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous." 68 Moreover, in this case, the district court did not appear to have uncritically accepted the findings prepared by Anderson's lawyer. 69 The crucial findings of fact differed significantly from those proposed by the plaintiff's lawyer. 70 Accordingly, the Court saw no reason to doubt that the district court's findings reflected its own careful conclusions, nor did it find a basis to subject the findings to a more stringent standard of appellate review. Since Anderson was decided, courts have occasionally confronted judicial plagiarism in the form of adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law and reversed under traditional clear error review. 72 But judicial plagiarism has attracted unfavorable attention from courts in other contexts, as Bright v. Westmoreland County 73 nicely illustrates. Bright began as a straightforward civil rights action in a Pennsylvania federal court arising out of the death of John Bright's daughter. 74 The defendants moved to dismiss the case, and, during a preliminary case conference held before Bright's response to their motions was due, the district court indicated that it intended to dismiss Bright's case based on an unpublished district court decision. 75 The district court also asked the defense lawyers to submit a proposed opinion and order, which they did. 76 The district court adopted the defendants' proposed opinion and order practically verbatim.
77 Bright appealed to the Third Circuit on several grounds, but in a footnote in his brief he asserted that he was appealing from an order supported by an opinion that was "ghostwritten" by lawyers for his adversaries. 78 From the Third Circuit's perspective, Bright had raised a substantial "procedural impropriety" that undermined the legitimacy of the district court's order. 79 The Bright court obtained from the defense lawyers a copy of the proposed opinion and order that they had submitted to the district court. 80 The proposed order and opinion were nearly identical to the opinion that the 2006) (applying the clearly erroneous standard while noting that "the wholesale and verbatim adoption of one party's findings requires us to review the record and the district court's opinion more thoroughly."); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 300-02 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting a proposed class action settlement where, among factors potentially suggesting that the district court did not reach its decision independently, the court had "asked the settling parties to submit the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which it 'would adopt basically'").
73 This request was apparently necessary because the proposed opinion and order were not included in the record on appeal; only the opinion and order signed by the district judge were part of the record. The district court's docket sheet did not indicate whether the proposed opinion and order were filed with the court and these documents did not otherwise appear in any public filing. Id. at 731 n.2. district court entered. 81 Other than minor edits for grammar and style, the district court made only two substantive changes: (1) in the analysis section of the opinion it eliminated a single sentence from the proposed opinion; and (2) it added a section dismissing Bright's claims against one defendant for lack of jurisdiction. 82 Significantly, the district court did not modify the section in the proposed opinion that dismissed Bright's state law claims based on the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. 83 This was important because the defendants had not argued in their motions to dismiss that the Act barred Bright's claims. 84 In other words, the defense lawyers had slipped a new argument past the district court nearly undetected. 85 Apparently inflamed by the defendants' insertion of a previously dormant affirmative defense in the opinion, Bright complained that it was "hard to reconcile this evident overreaching with [his] reasonable expectations as a litigant for a fair and independent judicial review of his claim." 86 The Third Circuit agreed for reasons to be explained. Initially, the Bright court distinguished this case from one in which a district court adopts the prevailing party's findings of fact verbatim, which, while disapproved, provides no basis for reversal if the district judge exercised independent judgment in adopting the findings. 87 The court reasoned that there was no authority to support the preparation of an opinion by a party; that practice reflects a district court's failure to perform its judicial function. 88 Elaborating, the court stated:
Judicial opinions are the core work-product of judges. They are much more than findings of fact and conclusions of law; they constitute the logical and analytical explanations of why a judge arrived at a specific decision. They are tangible proof to the litigants that the judge actively wrestled with their claims and arguments and made a scholarly decision based on his or her own reason and logic. When a court adopts a party's proposed opinion as its own, the court vitiates the vital purposes served by judicial 81 opinions. We, therefore, cannot condone the practice used by the District Court in this case. 89 Beyond this fatal procedural flaw, there was no evidence in the record that the district court had independently reviewed the facts that the defense lawyers offered in support of the reasoning in the opinion. 90 Nor was there any evidence in the record on which to conclude that the opinion was the product of the district court's independent judgment. 91 The court in Bright therefore held that the district court's adoption of the defendants' proposed opinion and order and the procedure used to solicit them were improper, and reversed and remanded the case to the district court to reevaluate the defendants' motion to dismiss in a manner consistent with the opinion.
92
A somewhat similar scenario unfolded in United States v. Jenkins. 93 In that case, Navy quartermaster Troy Jenkins was court-martialed and convicted of three sex crimes. 94 The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") affirmed Jenkins' conviction on two counts. He appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF"), arguing that the CCA had not afforded him the independent review of his convictions which he was due under Article 66(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 95 Jenkins contended that the CCA's replication of large portions of the government's answer brief was an abuse of discretion, negated any appearance of judicial impartiality, and undermined the integrity of its opinion. 96 He had a point:
The CCA opinion . government argued that the CCA had not erred, that there was no appearance of partiality by the CCA, and that to evaluate the independence of the CCA's review would be imprudent. 99 Although acknowledging that the CCA opinion contained several indicators of independent review, the CAAF questioned whether Jenkins had received the review of his convictions to which he was entitled. 100 The slices of the government's brief that were incorporated in the CCA included contested factual matters and legal issues to the point that the nature and substance of the CCA's independent analysis, if any, were disguised. 101 As the court observed, "neither we nor the parties can be sure where and perhaps whether the Government's argument ends and the lower court's independent analysis begins." 102 The court did not need to make any sort of "mathematical calculation" of the lower court's replication of the government's brief to reach this conclusion; it was facially apparent that substantial portions of the CCA opinion were derived wholly or virtually verbatim from the government's brief. 103 The CCA's vast replication of the government's brief in its opinion prevented the CAAF from determining whether Jenkins had received the probing review of his convictions to which he was entitled under Article 66(c). 104 As a result, the CAAF set aside the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new review before a different panel of judges.
105
The Bright and Jenkins courts seem to have reached correct results. In both cases, the appellants made strong arguments that the lower courts had improperly delegated their judicial responsibilities to the victors. In Bright, the district court's embrace of a new argument slipped in by the defendants was especially damning. 106 If the lower courts in Bright and Jenkins did not in fact cede their judicial responsibilities to the prevailing parties, they invited reversal by not suitably describing or demonstrating their exercise of independent judgment. In contrast, a trial court's instruction or request that the parties prepare draft orders for its consideration that contain no advocacy and which it may or may not adopt based on its independent analysis of the issues, is benign. 107 A court's adoption of a party's proposed findings of fact is not clear error-and thus is no basis for reversal-if it can be shown that the court conducted an independent review of the case before embracing those findings. 108 The same is necessarily true for a court's adoption of a party's proposed conclusions of law.
Despite the lower courts' troubling practices in Bright and Jenkins, however, neither case discusses whether judicial plagiarism constitutes judicial misconduct. If the courts were concerned about potential judicial ethics violations by the lower courts, they either addressed those concerns privately or, more likely, saw no need to analyze those issues because the cases did not come to them as judicial misconduct matters. Even so, the cases are instructive. They clearly indicate that a court's verbatim adoption of a prevailing party's findings of fact and conclusions of law, or replication of a party's brief in an opinion, are improper where the court's practice reflects a lack of independent judgment or suggests the court's abdication of its judicial function. Such conduct violates judicial ethics rules as well as requiring appellate correction. Still, as we are about to see, there appears to be only one reported judicial misconduct case focused on judicial plagiarism.
III. JUDICIAL PLAGIARISM AS ALLEGED JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
The lack of case law on judicial plagiarism as a form of judicial misconduct is surely a product of factors beyond the posture of the cases in which the subject has been raised. One factor at the core must be lawyers' general reluctance to report perceived misconduct by judges to judicial conduct commissions or to courts' judicial councils for fear of retaliation. 108. See, e.g., McClam-Brown v. Boeing Co., 142 F. App'x 75, 76 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Here, unlike in Bright, we are convinced that the district court conducted an independent review of the case. The findings of fact are replete with citations to the record, and the court heard argument from the parties before issuing its opinion."); Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 P.3d 1112, 1119 n.15 (Alaska 2011) (crediting the trial court's fact-finding and stating that "[i]t is not clearly erroneous per se for a trial court to adopt one party's proposed findings of fact."); Indus. Indem. Co. v. Wick, 680 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Alaska 1984) (permitting trial courts to adopt findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by lawyers "so long as they reflect the court's independent view of the weight of the evidence").
109. See Bast & Samuels, supra note 7, at 803 (stating that lawyers who think that a judge has engaged in plagiarism are unlikely to complain about the practice "for fear of raising the judge's ire, knowing that [they are] likely to appear before the judge in a future case"); David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial Discipline, 76 TENN. L.
In any event, there appears to be only one reported disciplinary case on judicial plagiarism, In re Complaint of Doe, 110 which was decided by the chief judge of the Eighth Circuit in 2011.
Doe involved several claims of judicial misconduct by a civil litigant against the district judge who dismissed his lawsuit, one being judicial plagiarism. The complainant estimated that the district judge plagiarized approximately 55 percent of the defendant's brief when drafting the order dismissing his lawsuit, or 65 percent if the recitation of the facts was omitted. 111 The Doe court succinctly dismissed the allegations because they went directly to the merits of the district judge's ruling and therefore were not properly the subject of a judicial conduct complaint.
112 If the misconduct allegations were not merits-related, the complainant's claim warranted dismissal as being groundless, as the court explained:
Complainant accurately identifies many similarities between the defendants' briefs and the district judge's order. Lawyers craft briefs for the express purpose of aiding the judge in making her decision, and the district judge is entitled to borrow from those briefs as she may see fit. Judges must be granted considerable leeway in the drafting of orders.
The subject judge apparently treated the parties' briefs as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In doing so, a district judge reflects the historic practice of a judge asking the prevailing party to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and even the order itself. 113 Continuing, the court explained that the district judge had not asked the defense lawyers ex parte to draft the order granting their motion. 114 Rather, she relied on the defendants' briefs in fashioning her opinion, "albeit often in verbatim fashion and without attribution." 115 Contrary to the plaintiff's allegations, "[s]uch judicial appropriation [was] not judicial misconduct."
116
The district judge's order was balanced, careful, and thorough. 117 As a result, the plaintiff's judicial plagiarism claim "lack[ed] sufficient evidence to raise an inference of misconduct."
118
At first glance the Doe court appears to have gotten the decision right given the status of the law at which the court might have been expected to look in analyzing the allegations against the district judge. If the district judge independently analyzed the facts and the law before reaching her decision and simply copied the defendants' brief because it was "careful, thorough, and balanced in tone," 119 then her actions likely would have passed muster even if reviewed by the skeptical courts in Bright 120 and Jenkins.
121 At the same time, the fact that the complainant's allegations went to the merits of the district judge's ruling should not have been dispositive since a plagiarized decision is not or should not be the accused court's ruling on the merits; that's the point. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate the extent, quality, or even existence of the district judge's independent review given the facts in the opinion. And without those facts it is difficult to see how this was not another case, like Jenkins, in which no one could "be sure where and perhaps whether the [prevailing party's] argument ends and the lower court's independent analysis begins."
122 Finally, the Doe court seems to have accepted without question the practice of courts copying a prevailing party's submissions verbatim so long as the court does not communicate ex parte with the prevailing party about the decision. 123 the district court's opinion was tainted by bias or partiality. Nor does the absence of ex parte communications necessarily resolve concerns about the appearance of fairness, or refute claims of judicial incompetence or lack of diligence.
IV. ANALYSIS
Ultimately, the question of whether judicial plagiarism constitutes misconduct is not easily answered. The practice cannot be justified as casually as the Doe court apparently would like. Some of the reasons offered to defend the practice do not withstand scrutiny. For example, some scholars contend that judges cannot commit plagiarism when writing in their judicial role because judges' writing is not expected to be original.
125
The originality point may be true, but plagiarism is generally understood to encompass the misappropriation of ideas in addition to the copying of someone's words. 126 More fundamentally, the focus in judicial plagiarism cases is not judges' writing but their reasoning and decisions; their borrowed writing is relevant because it may indicate bias, partiality, or incompetence. Thus, judges' supposed freedom to adopt parties' written work as their own without violating any norms does not end the inquiry.
A better argument is that judges' reasoning does not have to be original so long as they reach correct results, meaning that it is impossible for them to plagiarize by misappropriating ideas. 127 But that argument is not good enough, because it ignores the requirement that courts' decisions be independent. Even if a judge finds for a party on a theory the party urged, that must be because the judge concluded that the theory was correct on the facts-not because the judge unthinkingly adopted the party's position. 128 Consider, for example, the trial court's conduct in Trieschmann v. Trieschmann. 129 The trial court announced its decision in a letter to the parties in a divorce action in which it wrote that "the only just solution" to 125. Bast & Samuels, supra note 7, at 803; see also Morrissey, supra note 4 (quoting a law professor as saying that it would be acceptable for a judge to lift every word of an opinion from a party's brief if the party's arguments were good because judges owe "'no duty of originality'").
126. 130 The trial court directed the wife to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment consistent with her memorandum. 131 On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion because it "failed to examine the relevant facts and law and demonstrate a rational decision making process in reaching its conclusions."
132 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed, observing that it could not determine whether the trial court's decision was the product of its own reasoning or that of the wife's lawyer. 133 In fact, the wife's memorandum that the trial court adopted was "devoid of any explanation or reasoning" as to why views on the disputed facts and law were superior to her husband's positions. 134 The Trieschmann court accordingly reversed the judgment below and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to consider all of the relevant facts and law in reaching its decision, and to state the factors it relied upon in doing so.
135
Comparisons to plagiarism in scholarship also fail as a basis for defending judicial plagiarism. For example, one reason that plagiarism in scholarly writing is condemned is that the plagiarist wrongly gets credit for the work or idea of another, while the true author or thinker is denied credit for her work or idea. Judges do not care about receiving credit for the quality of their opinions the same way, say, an academic author does. Lawyers whose written work judges adopt do not care about receiving credit for their work beyond winning. Moreover, when judges adopt lawyers' work, the lawyers not only get credit for winning but they can proudly tell clients that their work was so good that the court adopted it verbatim or wholesale.
Again, this argument misses the mark. The issue in judicial plagiarism is the fairness and independence of the court's judgment. It may be that a court that simply adopts the prevailing party's findings of fact and conclusions of law, or that pastes portions of a party's brief into its opinion with no changes, has thoroughly analyzed the issues, reached its own conclusions, and determined that it cannot say what needs to be said better 130 137 where the defense lawyers pulled a fast one on the inattentive judge, and slipped into the decision they prepared for him a legal theory they never before raised. 138 In addition, "[t]he adversarial zeal of counsel for the prevailing party too often infects what should be disinterested findings [of fact] to entrust their preparation to the successful attorney." 139 In short, even lawyers who would never attempt the tactics of the defense lawyers in Bright may not be able to resist subtly slanting findings of fact in their clients' favor.
Judge Richard Posner essentially argues against the concept of judicial plagiarism first by defining plagiarism as having a reliance element: "The reader has to care about being deceived about authorial identity in order for the deceit to . . . constitute plagiarism. More precisely, he has to care enough that had he known he would have acted differently."
140 Then, as an example of the "innumerable intellectual deceits that do little or no harm because they engender little or no reliance . . . and so . . . escape the plagiarism label," he offers the practice of judges having clerks and others write their opinions for them. 141 Indeed, he continues, judges "sometimes insert into their opinions, without attribution, verbatim passages from lawyers' briefs; and many orders, findings of fact, and other documents signed by judges are actually prepared entirely by the parties' lawyers, again without attribution."
142 Yet, because judges do not financially profit from this practice, lawyers are aware of it, and judges are not concerned with originality in their opinions, he reasons that it cannot be called plagiarism.
143
This argument has four notable flaws. 144 First, the argument assumes that judges who copy lawyers' work have independently made the findings or reached the conclusions stated in that work. Of course, judicial plagiarism allegations are premised on the belief that the accused judges acted otherwise. Second, it ignores the potential appearance of impropriety that 136. See, e.g., In re Doe, 640 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the court's decision, which was adopted verbatim from the defendants' briefs, was "detailed, careful, thorough, and balanced in tone").
137 judicial plagiarism creates. Third, most lawyers who thought that judges would not fairly and impartially decide cases as potentially evidenced by the verbatim copying of opponents' findings of fact, conclusions of law, legal memoranda, or briefs would, when permitted, act on that concern by seeking a change of judge. 145 Fourth, the fact that plagiarism in academia and print journalism sometimes involves a profit motive does not mean that greed is an essential element of the charge. In summary, Judge Posner's preemptive discount or dismissal of judicial plagiarism as a concept is ineffective.
Although the key arguments offered in defense of judicial plagiarism are unpersuasive, it does not follow that judicial plagiarism necessarily constitutes misconduct. Courts often carry heavy caseloads and many judges do not have law clerks to assist them. 146 Litigants' need for judicial efficiency should accommodate some level of borrowing by judges from the work of lawyers who appear before them. 147 Trial and appellate lawyers generally understand this and should be able to explain as much to their clients. What matters most is that judges decide issues correctly; how they explain or express their correct decisions is secondary. 148 As the In re Complaint of Doe 149 court observed, judges require some leeway when preparing opinions and orders. 150 In addition, the argument that judicial plagiarism is misconduct because it reflects bias or partiality by the accused judge is a difficult one to make given the principle that bias or prejudice normally must be rooted in an extrajudicial source to require a judge's disqualification or recusal. 151 Reason suggests that the general rule should not apply to allegations of judicial plagiarism because, while a judge's adverse ruling typically does not evidence bias or prejudice, in the typical case it also does not appear that the judge's decision is actually the decision of an adversary. Still, the traditional approach represents a hurdle that those case involves difficult scientific concepts or issues of a highly technical nature, such that the court might reasonably be expected to need the parties' assistance in describing or explaining them in its decision or findings; 159 (12) whether both parties were invited to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law or orders; and (13) any other factor that either reasonably indicates the court's exercise of independent judgment or that reasonably negates that conclusion or materially diminishes its likelihood. 160 Misconduct determinations will depend on the facts of the particular case. The extent of the judge's copying will be the primary focus in most cases, but it is only a starting point. Beyond that, not all factors will be material or relevant in all cases, and they may be assigned varying weights in different cases depending on the facts. Returning to the initial example in the Introduction, the fact that the judge heard arguments and received evidence before adopting verbatim the prevailing party's findings of fact and conclusions of law should not alone negate allegations of judicial plagiarism, even though the fact that she did so is one important factor to consider. After all, if the judge allegedly favored the prevailing party for illegitimate reasons, the trial may have been nothing more than an elaborate ceremony.
Another factor worth considering but difficult to evaluate is the existence of qualifying statements by the judge before the challenged order or opinion is entered, or contained in the opinion or order itself. 161 Statements to the effect that the court fully considered the issues and reached an independent decision may not be sufficient to overcome bias or partiality concerns in a case in which other factors indicate a lack of judicial independence. 162 On the other hand, a court's comments to the parties about the findings of fact or order it expects them to prepare for its consideration may, together with other factors, suggest that the challenged findings, opinion, or order, while superficially a cut-and-paste job, reflect the judge's independent reasoning and conclusions. 163 Rarely will a court's declaration of its own independence, standing alone, alleviate bias, fairness, or partiality concerns in the face of contrary evidence.
If a judge's opinion, order, or findings of fact do not represent the judge's independent decision, there are several unfortunate possibilities beyond reversal on appeal and, presumably, attendant embarrassment. First, the judge did not decide the case fairly and impartially, which is generally considered to be judicial misconduct. 164 Second, the judge was neither biased against the losing party nor partial toward the winner, but instead lacked the legal knowledge, skill, or thoroughness required to perform her duties and can thus be characterized as incompetent. 165 Incompetence also constitutes judicial misconduct. 166 Incompetence will be established where, for example, an appellate court reverses as clearly erroneous a trial court's findings of fact adopted verbatim from a party's proposed findings. 167 Third, the judge adopted the prevailing party's findings or argument verbatim because the judge did not have time to do anything else, or simply because that was the easiest route to a decision. Either way, the judge's conduct, even if not incompetent, reflects a lack of diligence, and judges' failure to perform their judicial duties diligently is misconduct. 168 Of course, courts must be concerned not just with actual bias, prejudice, or partiality, but also the appearance of those influences. 169 Judges are required to disqualify themselves in cases in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 170 In evaluating the appearance of partiality, judges' conduct is measured against an objective standard. 171 Thus, the question is whether "an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the relevant facts would entertain a significant doubt that the judge in question was impartial." 172 In most cases, the same factors that may be used to determine whether judicial plagiarism constitutes misconduct will suffice to decide whether a judge's decision appears to be improper. In cases in which appearances are at issue, however, it may be reasonable to assign greater weight to the court's statements regarding the parties' submission of proposed findings or orders, or its adoption of portions of a party's brief or memorandum.
As for any discipline that might be imposed, that will surely depend on the facts of the particular case. A judge that adopts a party's findings of fact verbatim or copies wholesale from a party's brief because of bias, prejudice, or partiality must be treated differently from a judge who is deemed to be incompetent or who is found to lack diligence. The former conduct is much more serious, even if the effect on the losing party is the same. Biased or prejudiced judges are intolerable in our adversarial system and thus deserve significant discipline. In cases in which the judge is determined to be short on competence or lacking diligence, on the other hand, medicinal discipline in the form of judicial education or assistance with docket management may be in order.
V. CONCLUSION
Litigants reasonably expect the judges who hear their cases to be fair, impartial, and engaged. Lawyers expect the same things of the judges before whom they appear. Judicial plagiarism either defeats or diminishes all of these expectations. Although it is true that many courts are stretched thin and the need for judicial efficiency may occasionally accommodate the practices criticized here, those cases should be rare. Deciding cases and writing opinions are central judicial responsibilities. Courts that abdicate their responsibilities or do not take them sufficiently seriously disserve the parties and diminish respect for the judicial system as a whole. When all of the issues are tallied up, judicial plagiarism cannot be justified. In some cases it may rise to the level of judicial misconduct. Whether it constitutes misconduct in a given case should be evaluated in light of the factors identified in this Article.
